Assassinating a CEO is violent. Stalking the CEO so you can shoot him is not (or so says this court).
I’ve written a lot about the difficulty federal law has in saying what qualifies as a “crime of violence.” See, e.g., this Yoda-themed post, this Pickles-themed post, this ‘O Brother Where At Thou’ themed post, this Thoreau-themed post, and this boring un-themed post.
To determine if an offense qualifies as a crime of violence, SCOTUS has instructed courts to use the ‘categorical’ approach, or if the statue has multiple parts: the ‘modified categorical’ approach.
It’s kind of a mess.
Essentially, courts must look not at the crime as actually committed (e.g., stalking to commit an assassination) but rather whether there is any conceivable way to violate the statute nonviolently.
This week, applying that analysis, the court hearing the case of Luigi Mangione determined that 18 U.S.C. §2261A (i.e. interstate stalking or cyberstalking) is not a crime of violence. As such, it cannot be used as a predicate for 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (using a firearm to commit a federal crime of violence). Which further means that 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (death penalty eligibility for a violation of 924(c)) also fails.
This is not really surprising. As I mentioned in this Miami-themed post, using 2261A as a predicate for 924(c) is new, so it hasn’t been tested in the courts. This test did not go well. My guess is the same result is likely in the case involving the Minnesota lawmaker assassin.
The court was quick to point out the “apparent absurdity” of the analysis, but courts follow precedent and that’s what SCOTUS said to do.
So no death penalty for Luigi.
You can read the opinion here.